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Summary  findings
Child labor is a widespread, growing problem in the  school. Of all children between 7 and 14, about  90
developing world. About 250 million of the world's  percent helped with household chores.
children work, nearly half of them full-time. Child labor  Boys and girls tend to do different types of work. Girls
(regular participation in the labor force to earn a living  do more household chores while boys work in the labor
or supplement household income) prevents children  force.
from participating in school.  The data do not convincingly show, as most literature
One constraint on Ghana's economic growth  has been  claims, that poverty is the main cause of child labor. But
inadequate human capital development. According to  poverty is significantly correlated with the decision to
1992 data for Ghana, one girl in three and one boy in  send children to school, and there is a significant
four does not attend school. The figures are worse in  negative relationship between going to school and
rural areas.  working. Increased demand for schooling is the most
Canagarajah and Coulombe studied the dynamics of  effective way to reduce child labor and ensure that
how households decided whether  to send children 7  Ghana's human capital is stabilized.
through  14 to school or to work, using household survey  The high cost of schooling and the poor quality and
data for 1987-92.  They do not address the issue of street  irrelevance of education has also pushed many children
kids, which does not imply that they are less important  into work.
than the others.  And family characteristics play a big role in the child's
Unlike child labor in Asia, most child labor in Africa,  decision to work or go to school. The father's education
especially Ghana, is unpaid work in family agricultural  has a significant negative effect on child labor; the effect
enterprises. Of the 28 percent of children engaged in  is stronger on girls than on boys. So adult literacy could
child labor, more than two-thirds were also going to  indirectly reduce the amount of child labor.
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Child labor is a widespread and growing phenomena in the developing world. ILO (I 996a)
estimates put the prevalence of child labor as 250 million in the World, out of which 61 percent
is in Asia, 32 percent in Africa and 7 percent in Latin America. The same source also indicates
that 120 million children are full time workers and 80 percent of them are between 10-14 years of
age. In terns  of child labor force participation rates Africa ranks highest with 33 percent in East
Africa, 24 percent in West Africa and 22 percent in middle Africa, followed by East Asia and
South Asia with 20 and 14 percent respectively (see Figure 1 below). The above information
indicates the intensity of child labor and the necessity to address it,  in order to eliminate its
adverse effects on human capital development and the future growth potential of developing
countries.
Figure  1: Child Labor Force Participation Rates in the developing countries














2The literature distinguishes child labor and child work, where the latter is the more unhannful
and probably healthy kind, and includes helping household in various chores and household
activity. These activities may take place after school hours or during holidays more intensively
and are probably inevitable in rural areas. ILO's Minimum Age convention authorizes the
employment of children above 12 or 13 years in certain type of light work under certain
conditions (ILO, 1995). On the other hand, Child Labor is defined as the participation of school-
aged children on a regular basis in the labor force in order to earn a living for themselves or to
supplement household income. Child labor, therefore, prevents school participation and also
possibly exposes them to health hazards. Empirical studies reveal that children contribute as high
as one third of household income at times and their income source can not be treated as
insignificant by poor families (Patrinos and Psacharopoulos, 1995).
One of the major constraints in Ghana's growth challenge has been the lack of human capital
development. The enrollments rates have not been picking up fast and the future trend on human
capital does not look optimistic. The non-school attendance rates in Ghana are very high with
wide gender disparities. 1992 GLSS data indicate that one in every three girls and one in every 4
boys does not attend school. The rural non-schooling is higher, with 37 percent for girls and 28
percent for boys. Ghana 2000 in its strategy for accelerated growth in Ghana argued for massive
investment in primary education as a way of building the necessary human capital for sustainable
growth (World Bank, 1993). In this context, it is important to understand the dynamics of
household decision making of whether to send children to school and/or work, to benefit from
investments in education. If not, colossal public investments in education are not likely to get
children into class rooms.
It has been noted that inconsistency between minimum age for employment and schooling in
most countries makes the implementation of these laws complicated (ILO, 1996). This seems to
be the case for Ghana as well. Ghana's labor Decree (1967) prohibits employment of children
under the age of 15, although the law permits undefined "light" work by children. The Education
Act (1961) states that education is free and compulsory, although it does not define until what
3age the child should be in school. This indicates the problems of addressing child labor through
legislation alone.
This paper tries to investigate the child labor phenomena in Ghana in conjunction with school
participation trends. In addition to citing examples from literature, this paper uses three rounds
of the Ghana Living Standards Survey and analyses the issue of child labor at the household
level where it takes place. The study does not focus on child labor away from home, i.e. street
kids and prostitution. Also the definition used for child labor force participation used in this
paper excludes household chores such as fetching wood, fetching water, cooking, cleaning and
child care and similar activities undertaken by  a boy or girl child in the household. However,
household chores are accounted for separately. This paper addresses an aspect of labor markets
which has not been discussed in Ghana in any detail in the past literature.
The next section describes the data sources, while the following section gives a description of
tabulations on child labor and school participation trends in Ghana based on the data available.
Section 4 presents the econometric model used in this paper to analyze the joint probability and
trade-off of child labor and schooling in Ghana. Section 5 discusses the results of the
econometric model and where relevant showing evidence of similar findings from other studies.
The final section concludes with some policy lessons for eliminating child labor and ensuring
higher participation in schooling which is essential for Ghana's growth challenge.
2.  Data
It has been noted that there is very limited information on child labor in the developing countries
mainly because none of the employment and labor surveys capture child labor (Grootaert and
Kanbur, 1995). However, in Ghana we do have information.' The two main sources of data in
our analysis are Ghana Living Standards Survey (GLSS) 1987/88, 1988/89, and 1991/92 and
See  Canagarajah  and  Thomas  (1997) and Coulombe  and McKay  (1995)  for a detailed  description  of the GLSS
data.
4ILO Child Labor Survey (1996b). The latter was collected in a small sample of children who did
not attend school in Accra and two rural areas. Since the sample is non-random and also not
nationwide it is not wise to draw nationwide conclusions or policy recommendation. This data
set does not enable us to analyze simultaneously the decision of schooling and child labor. The
GLSS data sets which are mainly collected to understand poverty and welfare levels also contain
information on all types of household behavior including child participation in the labor market.
One interesting aspect of the GLSS data sets is that they have information on children's activity
in the last seven days, especially whether they went to school, worked in the labor market or
worked at home in household chores. Thus the infonnation enables us to divide the child activity
into four group - work only, school only, work and school and none. The information is available
for all individuals age 7 and above. The sample sizes and their categorizations are given in Table
1 below. As we can see the sample although covers on average more than 3000 households per
round and more than 15000 individuals, it has only around 3000-5000 children per survey round.
Since the questions are asked about schooling and work in the last seven days we use only those.
who were not on school holidays in order to minimize selection bias in our child labor sample.
This gives us a final child sample of 2876 for GLSS1, 3011 for GLSS2, and 3859 for GLSS3. In
each of the periods more than 60 percent of the children in the sample come from rural areas.
Table 1: Sample Sizes of GLSS
GLSS 1  GLSS 2  GLSS 3
(1987/88)  (1988/89)  (1991/92)
Number of households  3172  3434  4523
Number of individuals  15 227  15 369  20 403
Number aged 7-14  3357  3421  4717
Number not constraint by  2876  3011  3859
school holidays
Numberinrural  areas  1838  2056  2601
Source:  GLSSI-3.
As we have already noted the GLSS data captures majority of child labor age group and can be
treated as a reliable basis for child labor analysis. The fact that the data set was selected to
analyze household welfare does not bias the sample and  makes the data sets more interesting.
The wide set of information on household welfare also enables us to test the hypothesis whether
poverty is the main determinant of child labor among other things. The schooling information on
5children enables us to jointly exploit their linkage to understand their trade-off  for a child. It is
also worth noting since most children are not working due to personal convictions, their analysis
in a household framework is necessary for meaningful policy analysis. Also the claim that
education system is not responsive and relevant for labor markets necessitates us to analyze the
two choices simultaneously, rather than separately as many studies in the past have treated.
3.  Child Labor and Schooling: Tabulation Results
It is estimated, based on GLSS 1992 survey, that around 28 percent of children between the ages
7-14 years were involved in child labor in Ghana. This nationally amounts to around 800,000
children in child labor. However, over the three rounds child labor rates changed from 30.5 in
1987 to 22.4 in 1988 and 28 in 1992, which corresponds to the trend in the agricultural income
between 1987-92. In 1992 out of the total number of children who were working 66 percent were
also going to school and 90 percent were involved in household chores. 20 percent of boys and
17 percent of girls were observed to do both -working and going to school. The main difference
was in those who did nothing; 14 percent of boys and 22 percent of girls did nothing. Male labor
force participation for 7-14 year age group is 33.4 compared to 27.6 for girls, although if
domestic chores were to be included the participation rates will change to 88 for girls and 75 for
boys. These trends are similar to what has been observed in other developing countries where
data is available (ILO, 1996).
On the other hand school participation rates have evolved over time with 58.6 percent in 1987,
68.0 in 1988 and 72.7 in 1992. The girls' school participation increased from 53 to 68 percent,
while that of boys increased from 64 to 76 percent between 1987-92. Urban schooling
participation rates for the 7-14 year age group has increased from 68 to 83 percent while rural
rates increased from 53 to 67. All this indicate the positive trend in school participation rates,
despite the existence of child labor. However, these figures do not give any comfort as more than
one quarter of children in the school age population are not attending school.
6In terms of total labor force participation (LFP), children constitute 12.1 percent of the labor
force. Out of the total labor force in rural areas 14.4 percent and 4.4 percent in urban areas are
child workers. However, in terms of total number of labor hours children in the 7-14 year age
group contribute 5.3 percent with those above 65  years contributing 5.5 percent. Of the total
male LFP 14 percent is from those below 15 years, while the corresponding figure for females is
10 percent. All these data indicate the magnitude of child labor in Ghana. If household chores
were to be included, as noted in the literature (ILO, 1996), girls will easily outnumber the boys in
LFP.
A child begins to work as early as five years in rural Ghana, although the current data source
only gives labor participation information for those above 7 years of age. The average age of
child labor for a boy is almost twelve while for a girl it is around 11, indicating that girls start
working early. Girls also work more hours than boys and this difference is more pronounced if
We  take hours spent on household chores. Table 2 presents a typical profile of a boy and girl
child worker in Ghana. As can be seen from the table more than 90 percent of child labor is in
rural areas. It is also clear that these children work as many hours as adults. More than 5 percent
of total labor hours nationally is contributed by children, signifying the importance of child labor
in the national economy.
Table 2: Typical Profile of a Child Worker in.Ghana
Category  Male  Female
Average Age: Urban  11.8  11.3
Rural  11.0  11.0
Child worker Composition: Urban  4.5  5.2
Rural  49.1  41.2
Average hours in labor market per week  13.5  15.1
Average hours in household chores per week  13.3  17.1
Proportion of child workers in labor force  14  10
Proportion in total work hours  15.8  24.7
Child labor force participation rate  29.3  26.7
Participation in Trading (percentage)  1.3  6.4
Participation in Farming (percentage)  96.3  88.5
School Participation (percentage)  76.7  68.3
Contribution to total hours of participation nationally  5.4  5.3
7Source:  GLSS 3
One  of the claims in the literature  that child labor increases  with high levels  of welfare  is not
convincingly  proved in our analysis.  Tables  3 below  shows  that that there is no clear direction  in
this relationship  whether  we analyze  by regional  patterns  of poverty  or welfare  quintiles  of
households.  Poverty  incidence  and depth in rural  Savannah  and rural forest  is highest  but child
labor in rural  forest is not high. Incidence  and depth  of poverty  in rural coastal  areas  are lower
than rural  forest,  yet the incidence  of child labor  is not lower  than rural forest.  From all this, it is
clear that school  participation  is highly correlated  with household  welfare,  indicating  that
households  are willing  to send  their children  to school  as long as they have enough  resources  to
do so. Child  labor probably  exist as long as the threat  of poverty  lingers  in the household,
pushing  households  who  are above  the poverty  line also to send children  to work. In poor
households 2 7.3 percent  and in non-poor  households  8.6 percent  of the children  were working,
while  the corresponding  figures  for schooling  were 54.2  and 56.7  percent.  As we will see later
from our econometric  analysis  household  welfare  is indeed  weakly  related  to the incidence  of
child labor  and strongly  related  to school  participation  trends.
Table 3: Poverty and Child labor in Ghana 1992
HEADCOUNT  POVERTY-GAP  CHILD  LABOR  INDICATORS
RATIO  RATTO
REGION  Index  Contribution  Index  Contribution  Wor  School  Work  &  None
k  Only  School
Onl
y
Accra  23.0  6.0  5.6  5.7  3.1  86.3  0.8  9.8
Other  Urban  27.7  22.0  7.1  22.0  3.5  75.7  6.0  14.7
Rural  Coastal  28.6  12.9  6.8  11.2  12.1  48.6  24.2  15.1
Rural  Forest  33.0  31.1  8.3  30.4  6.9  47.5  36,9  8.7
Rural  Savannah  38.3  28.1  10.5  30.3  18.0  33.2  13.2  35.6
Source:  GLSS3
2  Based on the poverty line and number of poor people as defined in Ghana Statistical Service (1995).
8Since survey data was not available to analyze child labor and schooling simultaneously most
past studies have assumed child labor and schooling as mutually exclusive  categories. However,
since GLSS  data provides information on both we find that almost 19 percent of the children
were both working and schooling. Although there is no doubt that this would have had an
impact on their educational attainment, it clearly indicates that it is indeed possible in many cases
Table 4: Joint Labour Force and School Participation Rate (last 7 days),  by gender,  age,
ecological zones, expenditure quintiles, socio-economic group and religion - 1991/92
Work  Only  School  Only  Work  & School  None  All
Gender
Male  9.2  56.6  20.1  14.1  100.0
Female  9.4  51.0  17.3  22.3  100.0
Age
7  4.7  56.2  7.4  31.7  100.0
8  6.7  59.1  11.4  22.8  100.0
9  6.1  57.5  17.0  19.4  100.0
10  8.8  55.2  20.2  15.9  100.0
11  8.2  56.3  23.6  11.9  100.0
12  11.5  51.3  22.6  14.6  100.0
13  14.0  46.1  28.3  11.6  100.0
14  16.4  47.1  24.3  12.2  100.0
EJcpenditure  Quintile
Lowest  13.1  46.4  15.5  24.9  100.0
Second  6.8  54.1  21.7  17.3  100.0
Third  10.5  53.8  18.6  17.1  100.0
Fourth  - 8.7  55.2  19.2  17.0  100.0
Highest  5.7  64.6  19.1  10.6  100.0
Socio-Economic Group
Public  2.8  71.1  13.5  12.5  100.0
Wage-priv-formal  1.3  75.5  13.9  9.3  100.0
Wage-priv-informal  15.2  52.5  18.2  14.1  100.0
Self-agro-export  9.3  45.2  36.3  9.3  100.0
Self-agro-crop  15.3  35.4  24.7  24.7  100.0
Self-bus  3.4  74.2  9.0  13.3  100.0
Non-working  2.2  68.9  0.0  28.9  100.0
Religion
Muslim  12.4  49.7  12.8  25.1  100.0
Catholic  6.1  59.9  21.7  12.2  100.0
Protestant  4.8  62.1  25.6  7.5  100.0
Other  Christian  5.5  66.0  19.5  9.1  100.0
Animist  16.6  32.6  16.2  34.6  100.0
All  9.3  53.9  18.8  18.1  100.0
Source:  Authors'  calculations  from  the  GLSS  3.
Table 5: Occupation Distribution, by region and gender, (1991/92)
Urban  Rural  Male  Female  All
9Farming  59.2  96.3  96.3  88.5  92.7
Trade  22.3  1.7  1.4  6.3  3.7
Processing  11.7  0.7  0.5  3.3  1.8
Other  6.8  1.3  1.8  1.8  1.8
All  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0
#of  obs.  103  954  567  490  1057
Source: GLSS 3.
to have these activities coexisting. One interesting observation from Table 3 is that work and
school combination is a predominantly a rural phenomenon and very marginal in Accra and other
urban areas.
Table 4 presents the child labor and schooling participation pattern of children in Ghana in 1992
by various disaggregations. It is useful to note that with increasing age child labor plays an
increasing role in communities. In terms of welfare quintiles the child labor pattern is not
conclusive, but schooling shows a steady increase with higher levels of welfare. When
considering socio-economic group of parents it was noted that the children of private informal
sector wage earners and food crop producing farmers had the highest incidence of child labor.
Religion plays an important role in explaining child labor and schooling patterns of children.
Children from Christian households are more enrolled in school followed by Muslims and
animists, while the child labor pattern in relation to religion is the reverse of the schooling trend.
Majority of children are unpaid family workers, involved in family farm and enterprises (see
Table 5). It is worth noting that more than 90 percent of the children were involved in household
level agricultural activities. This is more the norm than exception in all Sub-Saharan African
(SSA) countries; in South Asian countries child labor is predominantly in the manufacturing
sector. In SSA only 3 percent of the children are wage workers, the  majority of whom are in
urban areas and boys (Ashagrie, 1993; ILO, 1996).
Wage differentials between children and adults have been discussed extensively in the literature.
It is clear that on average, in Ghana, children earn one sixth of what adults earn. The minimum
wage is 12,000 cedis, while only a meager 10 percent of child workers receive any where near
10that amount. With such low wages it is no surprise why employers prefer children to do most of
the work where possible. In family enterprises the ease and flexibility of household child labor
makes it attractive to employ children in a variety of tasks. The table below shows the sectoral
pattern of child labor and its predominance in farming activities, although there are more girls
involved in trading and processing compared to boys.
The Participatory Poverty Assessment (Nortan et al, 1995) found that parents did not want to
send their children to school due to inferior quality of teaching and teacher absenteeism. It was
also noted that some teachers wanted the children to work in their farms in return for classes for
them. This practice has disgusted many parents with Ghana's  schooling system and has pushed
them into involving their children in their own farms instead of teachers' farms. The high
opportunity cost of sending children to school has also been stated as a reason for not sending
them to school by many rural households.
Table 6: Schooling expenditure per student, public school only, by urban/rural, level and
items, 1991/92 (in Cedis, based on students currently enrolled)
Urban  Rural  Total
Mean  Median  Mean  Median  Mean  Median
Primary 1-2
Fees  3091  1450  762  550  1465  650
Uniforms  2280  2000  1508  1500  1741  1500
Books  866  400  337  200  497  200
Total  11082  7650  4838  3350  6681  4050
Primary 3-6
Fees  2505  1500  957  800  1484  850
Uniforms  2581  2425  1870  1800  2111  2000
Books  1480  900  752  500  999  600
Total  13360  9450  5968  4350  8408  5390
Sources: Authors'  calculations from the GLSS 3.
Note: The horizontal totals refer to the above three items as well as expenditure on parent/teacher associations, transportation, food
and other expenses in cash or in-kind.
Regardless of the rhetoric that education is free, many parents have had to pay some amount for
tuition and other direct costs in terms of uniform and books. This together with recent efforts of
11cost-recovery schemes have pushed parents in pulling their children out of school and sending
them to work. As the table below very clearly shows education is not free. This has pushed more
and more parents to stop their children from school as they just can not afford it. For instance, in
1992 per capita costs for publicly provided primary education has been in the range of 7,300
cedis which accounts for more than 15 percent of households mean per capita expenditure, thus
indicating the burden of school expenses on poor households. Also past studies (Demery et al,
1995) have found that the public subsidies benefit the urban non-poor more than the rural poor.
This emphasizes the point that the poor do not benefit from government resources towards their
human capital investments.
The ever changing nature of labor markets and low returns to education have made education less
attractive for many parents. This has especially been the case in rural areas, where formal
education makes very little difference given limited formal sector opportunities and most skills
are acquired by the "learning by doing" principle. Child labor is perceived as a process of
socialization in many countries and it is believed that working rather than education enables a
child to get acquainted with the skills required for being employable (Grootaert and Kanbur,
1995).
4.  The Econometric Model
Our model tries to understand the factors that influence the probability of child's school
attendance and working behavior in a reduced form model, focusing on a mixture of demand and
supply side variables. The particular choice of the estimation method has been influenced by the
decision making process, and available data. We do not want to assume that schooling and work
decisions of children are independent, which could be treated in a multi-nomial logit model. We
also do not want to assume any sequential process in the decision making process as we believe
it is not necessarily a sequential choice. Hence we treat schooling and working possibilities as
two interdependent choices.
12There are no studies yet which have used the dichotomic model for labor and education jointly
due to unavailability of data. With a view to exploiting the rich information on joint participation
in schooling and working of children in Ghana (GLSS), we use a bivariate probit model to test
the likelihood of children working and going to school; given varied individual and household
characteristics. Bivariate probit models allow for the existence of possible correlated
disturbances between two probit equations. It also allows us to test whether this joint estimation
makes significant difference as opposed to estimating univariate probits for each decision.
In the Bivariate probit, let the latent variable  y  represent the decision of working and  y2
represent the decision of schooling. Therefore the general specification for a two-equation model
would be
Y  =  ,  y,  = I  if y,  > O,  O otherwise
Y; = l2  + E2,  Y2 = 1 if y;  >  O, O otherwise,
E[E]  =  E[s 2 3  =  0,
Var[E]  =  Var[S2]  =  1,
COV[S  I, 2 ]  =  P.
and the likelihood function to maximise is
13;X, j3X 2
L=n  f f|  2  (Zi,  z2;  p)dz 2dzI
where 4  2'  the Bivariate normal density function, is
0 2 (zI,z 2 ;p)  =[27r(l  -p
2 )1
2 ]-' exp[-1/2(I-  p 2 )-'(z2  +z2  -2pz  z 2 )]
and,
p - coefficient of correlation between the two equations.
XI  and  X2 - row vectors of  exogenous variables which determnine  respectively, working and
schooling  propensities.
f,r  and  2  - associated parameter column vectors.
The coefficients need to  be adjusted to  be marginal effects, unlike standard linear regression
a(t)(P'x)
models. In this probit model  E[y] = 'D(P'x),  then the marginal effects are  a  (X).
13These marginal effects would obviously vary with the values of  x. It is worth noting that all the
coefficients P would have the same scale factor 4(P'x)  applied. Except for dichotomous variables
these marginal effects would be correct for infinitesimal changes in explanatory variables. In case
of dichotomous variables it is better to estimate the equation with and without the variable of
interest. For instance, the marginal effect  for the dummy variable i,(5j),  would be defined as
6, = (D(P-jx  i + pi) - d(3P,JXj)  where the subscript - i  represent all the variables but the  ih  ,  and
Y,_  are their sample means.
5.  Econometric Results
In the bivariate probit model there are two dependent variables. The first dependent variable is
defined  I  if the child went to school in the last seven days, and 0 if otherwise. The  second
dependent variable is defined as 1 if the child is economically active in the labour market the last 7
days and 0 if otherwise.  Annex Table 1 presents the definition and Annex Table 2 presents some
descriptive statistics of the explanatory  variables used in the analysis.
The child's age and gender which revealed differences in child labour and schooling participation
was  included as  child specific  variables in  the regressions. Since we  also noted earlier that
household  characteristics are  important,  we  included  some  parental  and  household  wide
characteristic variables. Parent specific variables are the education of the father and mother taken
separately  and  variables  accounting  for  their  presence  in  the  household.  For  household
characteristics variables  other than  general household  welfare, we  included  information on
siblings,  the  household's  main  socio-economic  category,  religious  background,  and  asset
ownership. We also included regional dummies to take care of the demand patterns of labour
markets, schooling distance and expenditure as supply variables. We felt these variables are bound
to have an impact on the pattern and intensity of child labour and school attendance.
We use two different estimations for each sub-sample estimation of the model. The second is
similar to the first except that it includes school supply variables, to test the relevance of schooling
supply in the household decision to send children to school or to work. Apart from estimating the
14model at the national level, we also estimated regional, gender, and age-group sub-samples to test
the robustness of estimates.
15Table 7:  Determinants of Labour Force Participation and School Participation,
Ghana, Children Aged 7-14
Model I  Model 2
Labour Force  School Participation  Labour Force  School Participation
Participation  Participation
Independent  Marginal  t-ratio  Marginal  t-ratio  Marginal  t-ratio  Marginal  I-ratio
Variable  Effect  Effect  Effect  Effect
Constant  -8.3280  -2.944  -2.1243  -8.127  -8.0076  -2.837  -2.3329  -8.305
Agey  0.1551  4.430  0.1883  5.584  0.1539  4.372  0.1931  5.486
Agey2  -0.0052  -3.134  -0.0089  -5.518  -0.0051  -3.086  -0.0091  -5.440
Male  0.0146  0.986  0.1136  7.620  . 0.0131  0.886  0.1131  7.220
Relson  -0.0469  -1.406  0.0006  0.018  -0.0463  -1.392  0.0106  0.316
Motherln  0.0396  1.598  -0.0111  -0.445  0.0395  1.588  -0.0179  -0.678
Fatherln  -0.0877  -3.014  0.0915  3.367  -0.0877  -3.018  0.0964  3.438
Medl  -0.0114  -0.449  0.0977  3.437  -0.0149  -0.587  0.0858  2.880
Med2  -0.0194  -0.846  0.1528  5.714  -0.0216  -0.943  0.1450  5.251
Med3  0.0002  0.003  0.0627  1.050  -0.0006  -0.009  0.0537  0.894
Fedl  -0.0174  -0.622  0.1158  3.721  -0.0239  -0.842  0.1170  3.537
Fed2  -0.0228  -1.185  0.1160  5.598  -0.0291  -1.504  0.1065  4.962
Fed3  -0.1119  -3.303  0.1661  4.772  -0.1186  -3.488  0.1556  4.362
Lnpcwell  1.1839  2.516  0.0863  5.569  1.1066  2.354  0.0843  5.112
Lnpcwell2  -0.0494  -2.521  - - -0.0464  -2.373  - -
ChildO6  -0.0009  -0.132  -0.0089  -1.301  -0.0009  -0.129  -0.0082  -1.156
Bro7I4  0.0080  0.772  0.0154  1.506  0.0079  0.752  0.0135  1.276
Sis714  -0.0129  -1.130  0.0315  2.609  -0.0137  -1.195  0.0361  2.842
MaleIS59  0.0195  2.553  -0.0151  -1.955  0.0198  2.594  -0.0141  -1.747
Feml559  0.0033  0.420  0.0070  0.848  0.0017  0.213  0.0046  0.529
91d60  0.0161  1.188  -0.0261  -1.955  0.0136  0.995  -0.0335  -2.390
Selfagro  0.1104  4.968  -0.0304  -1.319  0.1165  5.165  -0.0266  -1.078
Selfbus  -0.0903  -3.328  0.0467  1.833  -0.0882  -3.229  0.0486  1.841
Mheadeco  0.0229  0.904  -0.0579  -2.503  0.0289  1.135  -0.0447  -1.885
Muslim  0.0162  0.684  0.0742  3.279  0.0072  0.301  0.0511  2.166
Catho  0.0003  0.010  0.1505  5.687  -0.0062  -0.254  0.1373  4.969
Protes  0.0430  1.749  0.1957  7.569  0.0348  1.409  0.1815  6.781
Ochris  -0.0207  -0.937  0.1315  5.610  -0.0286  -1.283  0.1211  4.992
Landsize  -0.00004  -0.351  0.00004  0.300  -0.00003  -0.231  0.00007  0.511
Animal  0.0016  0.653  -0.0116  -6.726  0.0021  0.847  -0.0111  -6.130
Accra  -0.2646  -5.325  0.1374  3.223  -0.2984  -5.666  0.0798  1.646
Town  -0.1668  -6.575  0.1084  4.267  -0.1829  -6.691  0.0750  2.543
Rcoastal  0.1098  4.239  0.0704  2.752  0.0891  3.237  0.0214  0.760
Rforest  0.1320  6.409  0.2026  8.832  0.1218  5.822  0.1829  7.439
Tschexp  - - - - 0.0260  1.946  0.0345  2.490
Distance  - -0.0007  -2.722  -0.0012  -5.277
Smiss2  - - - - 0.1416  1.184  -0.5117  -3.416
p  -0.1252  -3.540  -0.1527  -4.165
InL  -3513.7  -3432.0
InL(=0)  -4500.5  -4500.5
Sample Size  3811  3811
16The results we obtained from the econometric model are in line with past research done on child
labour and schooling determinants as independent choices, except for a few differences in the
intensities of these effects. In terms of gender we find that there is no significant difference  between
boys and girls in their likelihood to work. This is mainly because our definition of work did not
include  household  chores  where  majority  of  the  girls  are  active.  In  terrns  of  labour force
participation this finding however may be at conflict with earlier findings, Psacharopoulos and
Arrigada (1989) and Patrinos and Psacharopoulos (1995), indicated that males were more likely to
be involved in the labour market. When the definition was expanded to include household chores it
clearly showed that girls are more likely to participate in the  more broadly defined labour market
activities than boys. The gender discrimination in schooling comes out very clearly in the schooling
equation where the male dummy had a higher probability of school attendance compared to girls.
In  literature it is often claimed that the main determinant of child labour is poverty (Grootaert and
Kanbur, 1995). Hence we included a welfare index which was household per capita expenditure
deflated by time and spatial price index.  Although a negative relationship was expected in the
labour force equation we found an inverted U shape relationship, which peaked at 152,000 cedis
and is slightly below the median expenditure (figure 2). This relationship was observed to be very
strong in rural areas. It may be due to the prevalence of slack season labour demand patterns in
regions where the poor live, or the presence of constraints in terms of other inputs and availability
of credit which distort this postulated relationship. However, the significant low effect of welfare
on the probability of labour force participation has also been found by Levinson (1991). This casts
doubts on the traditional, simplistic view that poverty pushes children into the labour market.
However, in terms of school participation the effect of welfare of the household is rather strong
and positive. The difference in school participation between the lowest and top deciles is around
12 percentage points. The above relationship is strong everywhere except  in the presence of
livestock in the household when the relationship between schooling and work is not different
between poor and non-poor households, partly because livestock is a time-intensive activity.
Our estimations also show that fathers with very high levels of education are likely to have a
negative effect on the likelihood of working, while mothers' education seems to influence only
schooling participation. The latter may be at odds with other empirical studies where the income
17variables used might not have been as good as ours and thus the parent's education variable would
have captured more of the permanent income effect. In general parents education has a strong
positive effect on schooling participation than working. The presence of the father at home is likely
to positively effect the likelihood of going to school as opposed to work, which is similar to Tienda
(1979).
As  figure 2  below  shows the probability of  going to  school  and  of  working based on  age
coefficients shows that there is steep increase in labour force participation in rural areas. It is also
possible that this result is due to  inadequacy of schooling system. The probability of going to
school increases with age until 11 years and then starts declining. This is consistent with the high
prevalence of delayed school attendance in Ghana (Glewwe and Jacoby, 1993).
It has been argued in the past that the age, presence and gender of siblings has a strong effect on
schooling and working patterns of members of households (Chernichovsky, 1985). We included
a series of variables to capture this effect -namely number of siblings in 0-6 and 7-14 age groups
and their gender, number of female and male adults. The only significant variable turns out to be
the presence of adult males in the household, whereby each additional male decreases the
probability of working by approximately 2 percent. On the other hand in the schooling equation,
there is a positive marginal effect on school participation, if there are other female siblings or
elderly people in the household. This is because if other members are able to take care of
household chores, then school aged children are liberated from household chores, which are
likely to prevent them from going to school. The literature also indicates that in large households
parents in general can not afford to send all children to school and hence some children attend
school at the expense of others (Lloyd and Gage-Brandon, 1994).
In terms of employment activity of parents we find that if parents are involved in agricultural
self-employment then children in such households are 12 percent more likely to work than
children from other type of households. On the other hand children from non-farming self-
employment households are less likely to work. The headship of household was found to affect
schooling more than labor force participation. It was observed that children from female headed
18household are 4 percent more likely to go to school rather than male headed households, which
is consistent with past research which indicates that female headed households were more
rational in intra-household resource allocation pattern and investing on essential items (Haddad
et al, 1996).
Figure 2: The probability of going to school and working by age and welfare levels.
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19Religious dummies did not matter in case of child labor force participation. However, in the
schooling equation all religious group dummies were significantly different from the reference
group. In relation to Animist (the reference group,) Protestants were 18 percent more likely,
Catholics 13 percent and Muslims 5 percent more likely to send their children to school. This
clearly reveals that religious groups have a significant influence not only on the values of
education in societies but also on the facilities they make available through free or subsidized
education facilities, which provides the incentive for parents to send children to school. In Ghana
many good primary school are run by Churches or Church organizations and they definitely have
a key role in school participation behavior.
Regional dummies which were included in the schooling and labor force equations showed
coefficients which were significantly different from zero in reference to the base region, rural-
Savannah. In the labor force equation the two urban dummies had lower rates and the two rural
areas had higher rates of participation than rural- Savannah. this can be explained by the
agricultural opportunities being limited and weather dependent in rural Savannah as opposed to
other rural areas, where there is more potential for employment year round in farming and non-
farning  activities.  This was also observed in our descriptive data tabulations whereby a large
number of children were observed to be idling in this region.
However, in terms of school attendance the regional dummies are positive and significantly
different from the reference group, rural-Savannah. Rural- Savannah has been observed to have
fewer good quality schools and mostly the schools available are not densely distributed. Even
after controlling for latter by a distance variable we find that the effect is significant which
indicates that schools are not of acceptable quality which operates as a disincentive in this region.
The distance to school, however, had significant negative strong effect on probability of going to
school as would be expected.
The schooling expenditure variable was included to identify the budget constraint on the
household as a deterrent on school participation. We observe that with high fees there is higher
school participation. It may be recalled that in Ghana, although public schools are meant to be
20free they charge indirect fees from parents which has been a disincentive for parents to send
children to school. The current effect is mainly coming from private schools in Accra who
provide good quality education for a official fee. This latter effect has been also observed in
Demery et al (1995) which showed that Accra had high private primary and secondary school
attendance.
Figure 3: Probability of schooling and working by distance to school
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In terms of labor force participation as one would expect schooling expenditure has a significant
deterrent effect. The high costs of schooling increases the probability of working. This is because
as children find that they can not afford school  they are pushed into working in order to enable
them to attend school or,  it may just completely prevent them from going to school and
participate in household enterprises.
21The results in Table 7 are based on the total sample, combining all regions, genders, and age
groups together. In order to see whether these findings are robust and whether there are any
nuances to the observations made, we estimate the models in different sub-samples. The models
were estimated as urban-rural, and male-female sub-groups (Tables 8-1 1). Annex Tables A3-A5
estimate the same relationship in terms of  7-10 year olds and 11-14 year olds samples and with
the inclusion of household chores. The sub-sample estimates confirm the overall results for
robustness of the estimates, although some additional differences could be observed.
22Table 8: Determinants of Labour Force Participation and School Participation,
Urban Areas, Children Aged 7-14
Model !  Model 2
Labour Force  School Participation  Labour Force  School Participation
Participation  Participation
Independent  Marginal  t-ratio  Marginal  t-ratio  Marginal  t-ratio  Marginal  t-ratio
Variable  Effect  Effect  Effect  Effect
Constant  -0.3555  -0. I32  -1.3422  -3.817  -0.0142  -0.005  -1.5146  -4.109
Agey  0.0651  1.910  0.1193  2.655  0.0628  1.784  0.1242  2.745
Agey2  -0.0023  -1.507  -0.0058  -2.707  -0.0023  -1.416  -0.0060  -2.774
Male  -0.0182  -1.135  0.1002  4.758  -0.0188  -1.131  0.1027  4.835
Relson  -0.0088  -0.287  0.0810  1.716  -0.0068  -0.218  0.0793  1.673
Motherln  0.0179  0.725  0.0086  0.214  0.0136  0.539  0.0133  0.329
Fatherln  -0.0334  -1.283  0.0257  0.808  -0.0327  -1.242  0.0229  0.709
MedI  -0.0103  -0.440  0.0917  2.244  -0.0071  -0.311  0.0880  2.165
Med2  -0.0022  -0.114  0.0820  2.536  -0.0019  -0.101  0.0814  2.525
Med3  0.0049  0.145  0.0456  0.857  0.0045  0.128  0.0454  0.846
Fedl  -0.0115  -0.405  0.1127  2.418  -0.0056  -0.196  0.1064  2.211
Fed2  -0.0311  -1.557  0.1176  3.725  -0.0198  -0.987  0.1046  3.271
Fed3  -0.0484  -1.890  0.1327  3.138  -0.0403  -1.552  0.1221  2.829
Lnpcwell  -0.0165  -0.037  0.0521  2.365  -0.0431  -0.096  0.0394  1.753
Lnpcwell2  0.0002  0.013  - 0.0017  0.089  -
ChildO6  -0.0037  -0.581  0.0008  0.082  -0.0038  -0.588  0.0000  0.005
Bro714  -0.0018  -0.209  0.0206  1.478  -0.0012  -0.139  0.0203  1.428
Sis714  0.0038  0.373  -0.0193  -1.088  0.0061  0.597  -0.0231  -1.283
Malel559  0.0019  0.310  -0.0166  -1.833  0.0028  0.460  -0.0175  -1.868
FemlS59  0.0066  1.069  0.0126  1.078  0.0109  1.602  0.0060  0.500
Old60  0.0218  1.543  -0.0154  -0.683  0.0253  1.753  -0.0228  -0.992
Selfagro  0.0827  4.101  -0.0274  -0.810  0.0706  3.455  -0.0089  -0.259
Selfbus  0.0007  0.039  0.0282  0.989  -0.0012  -0.064  0.0285  1.003
Mheadeco  0.0387  1.702  0.0204  0.720  0.0379  1.690  0.0214  0.752
Muslim  -0.0792  -3.092  0.0737  1.999  -0.0652  -2.565  0.0536  1.424
Catho  -0.0441  -1.694  0.0865  2.236  -0.0440  -1.584  0.0801  2.020
Protes  -0.0467  -1.907  0.1101  2.638  -0.0392  -1.591  0.0981  2.338
Ochris  -0.0523  -2.465  0.1036  2.870  -0.0449  -2.131  0.0911  2.516
Landsize  -0.0002  -0.461  0.0003  0.630  -0.0002  -0.531  0.0003  0.773
Animal  -0.0017  -0.226  -0.0097  -0.927  -0.0011  -0.152  -0.0106  -0.987
Accra  -0.0217  -0.829  0.0299  0.959  -0.0073  -0.266  0.0090  0.274
Tschexp  - - - - -0.0266  -1.876  0.0361  2.076
Distance  - - - - 0.0002  0.364  0.0000  0.084
p  -0.3479  -3.696  -0.3080  -3.041
InL  -735.2  -721.3
InL(=0)  -910.6  -910.6
Sample Size  1233  1233
23Table 9: Determinants of Labour Force Participation and School Participation,
Rural Areas, Children Aged 7-14
Model I  Model 2
Labour Force  School Participation  Labour Force  School Participation
Participation  Participation
Independent  Marginal  t-ratio  Marginal  t-ratio  Marginal  t-ratio  Marginal  t-ratio
Variable  Effect  Effect  Effect  Effect
Constant  -13.5930  -3.522  -2.5749  -7.317  -12.8470  -3.344  -2.8092  -7.346
Agey  0.1775  3.693  0.2335  5.055  0.1777  3.678  0.2346  4.807
Agey2  -0.0056  -2.486  -0.0109  -4.928  -0.0056  -2.474  -0.0110  -4.702
Male  0.0343  1.690  0.1167  5.907  0.0303  1.489  0.1140  5.462
Relson  -0.0557  -1.188  -0.0847  -1.941  -0.0506  -1.080  -0.0678  -1.495
Motherln  0.0466  1.369  -0.0199  -0.617  0.0453  1.322  -0.0341  -0.999
Fatherln  -0.1118  -2.737  0.1689  4.294  -0.1135  -2.782  0.1720  4.216
Medl  -0.0106  -0.296  0.0946  2.424  -0.0204  -0.569  0.0784  1.902
Med2  -00321  -0.953  0.2017  5.087  -0.0377  -1.127  0.1902  4.634
Med3  0.0429  0.339  0.2273  1.255  0.0373  0.298  0.1998  1.113
FedI  -0.0364  -0.944  0.1219  3.025  -0.0444  -1.125  0.1247  2.883
Fed2  -0.0188  -0.704  0.1080  4.001  -0.0266  -0.993  0.1008  3.589
Fed3  -0.1373  -2.705  0.1979  3.691  -0.1505  -2.967  0.1782  3.237
Lnpcwell  2.0199  3.142  0.1090  5.279  1.8337  2.860  0,1080  4.885
Lnpcwell2  -0.0838  -3.130  - - -0.0766  -2.872  -
ChildO6  0.0032  0.347  -0.0104  -1.098  0.0033  0.353  -0.0088  -0.897
Bro714  0.0168  1.067  0.0147  0.950  0.0157  0.985  0.0109  0.674
Sis714  -0.0194  -1.163  0.0589  3.379  -0.0202  -1.213  0.0665  3.566
Malel559  0.0310  2.765  -0.0123  -1.102  0.0317  2.848  -0.0095  -0.804
Feml559  -0.0034  -0.294  0.0077  0.674  -0.0075.  -0.640  0.0040  0.329
Old60  0.0192  . 1.041  -0.0299  -1.742  0.0132  0.706  -0.0383  -2.110
Selfagro  0.0929  2.868  -0.0229  -0.681  0.0998  3.036  -0.0254  -0.696
Selfbus  -0.1628  -3.930  0.0604  1.402  -0.1622  -3.893  0.0629  1.375
Mhead.eco  -0.0001  -0.002  -0.1417  -4.257  0.0134  0.379  -0.1188  -3.445
Muslim  0.0605  1.826  0.0637  2.140  0.0454  1.358  0.0363  1.156
Catho  0.0106  0.311  0.1823  5.148  -0.0077  -0.227  0.1610  4.348
Protes  0.0770  2.271  0.2446  7.339  0.0601  1.766  0.2269  6.526
Ochris  -0.0088  -0.283  0.1375  4.448  -0.0256  -0.813  0.1281  3.966
Landsize  -0.0000  -0.112  0.0000  0.093  0.0000  0.091  0.0000  0.280
Animal  0.0020  0.641  -0.0133  -6.940  0.0031  0.992  -0.0125  -6.148
Rcoastal  0.1224  3.667  0.0619  2.060  0.0763  2.136  0.0090  0.271
Rforest  0.1505  5.644  0.2280  8.463  0.1260  4.620  0.2059  7.106
Tschexp  --  - - 0.0605  3.357  0.0396  2.131
Distance  - - -0.0007  -2.155  -0.0014  -5.172
Smiss2  - - 0.2577  1.597  -0.5376  -2.889
p  -0.0217  -0.537  -0.1228  -2.969
InL  -2717.1  -2638.1
InL(=0)  .- 3330.4  -3330.4
Sample Size  2578  2578
24Table 10: Determinants of Labour Force Participation and School Participation,
Male Children Aged 7-14
Model I (Urban + Rural)  Model 2 (Rural only)
Labour Force  School Participation  Labour Force  School Participation
Participation  Participation
Independent  Marginal  t-ratio  Marginal  t-ratio  Marginal  t-ratio  Marginal  t-ratio
Variable  Effect  Effect  Effect  Effect
Constant  . -4.0827  -1.094  -1.9400  -5.461  -9.9333  -1.862  -2.3111  -4.656
Agey  0.1042  2.146  0.1609  3.567  0.1042  1.552  0.1934  2.972
Agey2  -0.0027  -1.170  -0.0073  -3.357  -0.0022  -0.685  -0.0086  -2.766
Relson  -0.0898  -1.865  -0.0384  -0.895  -0.0884  -1.293  -0.1137  -1.880
Motherln  0.0900  2.614  0.0043  0.132  0.1030  2.095  -0.0002  -0.004
Fatherln  -0.0812  -1.924  0.1048  3.021  -0.1411  -2.363  0.1825  3.563
Medl  -0.0369  -1.022  0.0396  1.060  -0.0492  -0.989  0.0701  1.277
Med2  -0.0550  -1.685  0.1539  3.949  -0.0788  -1.665  0.1863  3.284
Med3  -0.0611  -0.565  0.0158  0.190  0.0048  0.031  0.0767  0.435
Fedl  -0.0272  -0.649  0.0190  0.453  -0.0430  -0.739  0.0340  0.590
Fed2  -0.0223  -0.814  0.0676  2.423  -0.0411  -1.059  0.0610  1.611
Fed3  -0.0796  -1.628  0.1193  2.348  -0.1124  -1.604  0.1256  1.523
Lnpcwell  0.4456  0.721  0.0858  3.943  1.3786  1.553  0.1100  3.877
Lnpcwell2  -0.0189  -0.737  - - -0.0582  -1.581  - -
ChildO6  0.0094  1.037  0.0015  0.169  0.0166  1.316  -0.0011  -0.088
Bro7l4  0.0080  0.546  0.0163  1.176  0.0295  1.345  0.0161  0.695
Sis714  -0.0148  -0.861  0.0152  0.890  -0.0214  -0.844  0.0362  1.350
Malel559  0.0220  1.954  -0.0198  -1.982  0.0278  1.678  -0.0229  -1.505
Fem 1559  -0.0069  -0.597  0.0086  0.799  -0.0101  -0.620  0.0087  0.559
Old60  0.0204  1.014  -0.0441  -2.650  0.0420  1.536  -0.0539  -2.413
Selfagro  0.1180  3.576  -0.0651  -2.072  0.0742  1.580  -0.0849  -1.759
Selfbus  -0.0971  -2.363  0.0083  0.234  -0.1685  -2.857  0.0202  0.331
Mheadeco  0.0392  1.068  -0.0614  -2.052  0.0501  0.978  -0.1313  -3.031
Muslim  -0.0098.  -0.294  0.0773  2.686  0.0295  0.626  . 0.0769  1.909
Catho  -0.0546  -1.600  0.1452  4.022  -0.0415  -0.873  0.1822  3.751
Protes  0.0199  0.564  0.1732  4.790  0.0529  1.089  0.2194  4.686
Ochris  -0.0522  -1.673  0.1258  4.024  -0.0452  -1.009  0.1488  3.441
Landsize  -0.000005  -0.031  0.00008  0.453  0.000005  0.026  0.0001  0.490
Animal  0.00009  0.027  -0.0093  -4.769  0.0010  0.252  -0.0117  -5.251
Accra  -0.5972  -4.029  0.1409  2.057  - - - -
Town  -0.2317  -5.983  0.0796  2.186  -
Rcoastal  0.0650  1.713  0.0304  0.883  0.0511  1.008  0.0132  0.307
Rforest  0.0891  3.034  0.1696  5.371  0.0917  2.335  0.1951  5.026
Tschexp  0.0643  3.507  0.0176  1.064  0.0989  3.963  0.0170  0.769
Distance  -0.0007  -2.145  -0.0011  -3.316  -0.0008  -1. 704  -0.0014  -3.384
Smiss2  0.5180  3.166  -0.3983  -2.450  0.6508  2.920  -0.4584  -2.182
p  -0.1776  -3.331  -0.1473  -2.495
InL  -1682.8  -1352.7
InL(=0)  -2264.1  -1716.2
Sample Size  1971  1357
25Table 11: Determinants of Labour Force Participation and School Participation,
Female Children Aged 7-14
Model I (Urban + Rural)  Model 2 (Rural only)
Labour Force  School Participation  Labour Force  School Participation
Participation  Participation
Independent  Marginal  t-ratio  Marginal  t-ratio  Marginal  t-ratio  Marginal  t-ratio
Variable  Effect  Effect  Effect  Effect
Constant  -12.2130  -2.893  -2.8953  -6.505  -14.7970  -2.551  -3.5985  -5.746
Agey  0.2029  3.871  0.2285  4.130  0.2568  3.462  0.2867  3.  766
Agey2  -0.0075  -3.042  -0.0112  -4.246  -0.0094  -2.686  -0.0139  -3.828
Relson  0.0014  0.031  0.0553  1.080  -0.0176  -0.265  -0.0241  -0.354
Motherln  -0.0138  -0.379  -0.0353  -0,851  -0.0056  -0.111  -0.0677  -1.304
Fatherln  -0.0942  -2.332  0.0837  1.890  -0.0836  -1.437  0.1542  2.372
Medl  0.0104  0.286  0.1240  2.574  0.0126  0.236  0.0727  1.120
Med2  0.0079  0.242  0.1387  3.456  -0.0038  -0.079  0.1872  3.101
Med3  0.0593  0.713  0.0757  0.867  - - -
Fedi  -0.0232  -0.598  0.2022  3.680  -0.0423  -0.  763  0.2074  2.885
Fed2  -0.0374  -1.362  0.1456  4.447  -0.0094  -0.245  0.1425  3.390
Fed3  -0.1461  -3.078  0.1948  3.788  -0.1807  -2.465  0.2514  3.309
Lnpcwell  1.7969  2.536  0.0779  3.122  2.1062  2.164  0.1045  2.981
Lnpcwell2  -0.0756  -2.556  - - -0.0873  -2.153  - -
ChildO6  -0.0146  -1.425  -0.0172  -1.563  -0.0152  -1.012  -0.0159  -1.004
Bro714  0.0094  0.580  0.0093  0.572  0.0059  0.247  0-.0056  0.243
Sis714  -0.0168  -0.992  0.0508  2.478  - -0.0231  -0.983  0.0887  3.049
Malel559  0.0152  1.426  -0.0063  -0.494  0.0300  1.933  0.0098  0.530
Fem1559  0.0078  0.683  -0.0065  -0.466  -0.0031  -0.175  -0.0079  -0.418
31d60  0.0050  0.258  -0.0154  -0.661  -0.0174  -0.643  -0.0150  -0.492
Selfagro  0.1145  3.524  0.0160  0.418  0.1301  2.707  0.0343  0.626
Selfbus  -0.0774  -2.093  . 0.0845  2.119  -0.1540  -2.523  0.1077  1.579
Mheadeco  0.0278  0.792  -0.0309  -0.810  -0.0177  -0.352  -0.1045  -1.864
Muslim  0,0235  0.666  0.0048  0.127  0.0592  1.202  -0.0150  -0.304
Catho  0.0439  1.243  0.1107  2.620  0.0331  0.651  0.1201  2.125
Protes  0.0504  1.436  0.1855  4.429  0.0764  1.546  0.2336  4.215
Ochris  -0.0033  -0.102  0.1085  2.853  -0.0010  -0.021  0.0900  1.835
Landsize  -0.00005  -0.264  0.00007  0.294  0.00001  0.047  0.000003  0.012
Animal  0.0060  1.580  -0.0132  -2.164  0.0078  1.662  -0.0135  -1.903
Accra  -0.1561  -2.526  -0.0349  -0.489  - - -
Town  -0.1480  -3.974  0.0265  0.578  - - -
Rcoastal  0.1084  2.810  -0.0227  -0.510  0.1051  2.073  -0.0251  -0.477
Rforest  0.1569  5.290  0.1717  4.505  0.1702  4.3S1  0.2003  4.592
Tschexp  0.0101  1.292  0.0925  4.371  0.0363  2.694  0.1087  3.565
Distance  -0.0005  -1.294  -0.0012  -3.465  -0.0004  -0.890  -0.0012  -3.016
p  -0.1340  -2.496  -0.1140  -1.836
InL  -1706.0  -1255.7
InL(=O)  -2218.2  -1601.6
Sample Size  1840  1221
26For instance the educated father variable has a negative effect mainly on girl child labor and
positive effect on girl's school attendance than males. Male headed households also show lower
probability for labor force participation of a boy child than a girl child. We had already observed
that the girl child going to school is highly probable when the mother is the head of the
household. The Christian children were more likely to attend school, but this relationship was
much stronger in rural areas than urban areas.
Housekeeping activities were not included as apart of labor force participation as they are not
strictly income generating activities. However, as we observed in descriptive statistics, girls were
predominantly involved in domestic chores which were equally involving and time consuming
and hence prevented them from schooling. We also noted that when we take household chores
into account, girl children have a very high labor force participation rate than boys. However,
when we included the household chores together with labor force participation, except for the
gender effect we could observe from the tabular results in section 3, we did not find too many
inferences. The results indicate that girls are more likely to work, the presence of children less
than 6 years increasing the probability of working and not schooling, the presence of female
adults increased the probability of schooling and not working etc. It was also noted that not being
the son or daughter of the head makes the child more likely to participate in work and not in
school. All these findings further expound what we have already observed and do not contradict.
We already mentioned that the econometric strategy we adopted enables us to test the
interdepdenecies of  schooling and labor force participation choices in the household context.
Hence a significant negative relationship of the p would indicate that there is a trade off between
these choices and they compete with each other as opposing choices. The p  coefficients in our
estimates are negative, although their value (strength) differs between different sub-samples.  p
is high for urban than rural areas and high for older children and male children, showing the stark
nature of trade off.  However the p  is the labor force model with housekeeping chores is not
significantly different from zero, which implies that the broad definition of work is not at odds
with schooling or it is possible to have household chores and schooling without any costly trade
27off  (Table A5). Therefore, housekeeping activities are independent of the decision concerning
school as opposed to the relationship of school attendance vis-a-vis labor force participation.
6.  Conclusions and Recommendations
One out of every four children works in Ghana in either a labor market or an household
enterprise, while one out of every five children goes to school and works. Three out of every boy
child was attending school, while it was slightly lower for girls. The probability of children's
labor participation declines with rising levels of household welfare, although this relationship is
very weak. The corresponding relationship with schooling shows that school participation clearly
increases with welfare levels indicating the burden of schooling expenses on poor families.
Households who earn a larger share of their income from family enterprises, farming or
otherwise, are likely to have a greater demand for labor and have a higher probability of
obtaining them within the household as it is cheaper and flexible. This results in high child labor
participation in rural farming and urban informal sector, making the efficacy of legislation
questionable.
Child labor and schooling increase with the age of the child. Child labor is not independent of the
decision to school. Hence, addressing school participation can not be independent of demand
side issues. The high cost of schooling pushes children into the labor market to enable them to
afford school or pulls them away from school as they can not afford it. Hence, the official and
unofficial fee charged for schooling is negatively correlated with school participation. Apart from
reducing the cost, the school system needs to be flexible enough to recognize and adapt
according to the constraints of schooling in rural communities. The quality of education and its
relevance to the labor market needs to be given priority in future education reforms to ensure
improvement in public perception, which plays a key role in the decision to send children to
school (Glewwe, 1996).
Fathers with relatively high level of education have a significant negative influence on the
likelihood of the child working; this effect is stronger for girls than boys. Therefore, adult
28literacy  can also be useful  in reducing  child  labor indirectly.  Children  in households  where  the
father is present  are less likely  to participate  in the labor  market  and more likely  to be enrolled  in
school.  Religion  and  region of residence  are important  in explaining  variations  in both labor
force  and school  participation  rates; Christians  families  have a positive  impact  on schooling,
especially  in rural areas.
It is clear from the dynamics  of child  labor that the elimination  of child labor needs  sensitive
government  intervention  because:
*  existing  laws and decrees  need  to be policed  for implementation;
*  if the government  does not provide  arbitrage  no one else will provide  it;
*  the removal  of barriers  to attain  broader  human  capital  development  is critical  for broad
based  economic  growth;  and
*  increasing  school  participation  can realize  high private  and social returns  to education.
Ghana's challenge  of human  capital  development  is clearly  out of reach at current  rates of child
labor  and non-school  attendance  in Ghana.  A mix of legislation  to prevent  child labor and
incentives  to attend  schooling  is necessary  to meet Ghana's developmental  challenge  for the
twenty-first  century.
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32Annex  1: Definition of Variables  used in Probit
Dependent variables
Labour: I if worked in the last 7 days; 0 otherwise
School7: I if went to school in the last 7 days; 0 otherwise
LabourHk: I if Labour=l or have participated in housekeeping activities;  0 otherwise
Child characteristics
Agey: age in years
Male: I if male; 0 if female
Relson: I if head's son or daughter; 0 otherwise
Parent characteristics
Motherln: I if mother present in the household; 0 otherwise
Fatherln: I if father present in the household; 0 otherwise
MedO: I if mother has no finished primary education or formal education; 0 otherwise (reference  group)
Med 1: I if mother had completed primary education; 0 otherwise
Med2: 1 if mother had completed middle secondary  education; 0 otherwise
Med3: I if mother have some post middle secondary education; 0 otherwise
FedO:  I if father has no finished primary education  or formal education; 0 otherwise (reference group)
Fed I: I if father had completed primary education; 0 otherwise
Fed2: 1 if father had completed middle secondary education; 0 otherwise
Fed3: I if father have some post middle secondary education;  0 otherwise
Household characteristics
Lnpcwell:  welfare measure ( total household real expenditure, per capita, in log)
Mheadeco: I if the economic head is male; 0 otherwise
ChildO6:  number of sibling aged between 0 and 6
Bro7  14:  number of brother aged between 7 and 14
Sis7  14:  number of sister aged between 7 and 14
Malel 559: number of male adult aged between 15 and 59
Female 1559:  number of female adult aged between 15 and 59
Old60: number of elderly aged over 60 or more
Muslim: I if Muslim; 0 otherwise
Catho: I if Catholic;  0 otherwise
Protes: I if Protestant; 0 otherwise
Ochrist: I if Other Christian; 0 otherwise
Animist: I if Animist/Traditional;  0 otherwise (reference  group)
Selfagro: I if self-employment in agriculture is the main source of income; 0 otherwise
Selfbus: I if self-employment in non-agriculture  enterprise is the main source of income; 0 otherwise
Landsize: farming land area (in acres)
Animal: number of draught animals and cattle
Cluster characteristics
Accra: I if household resides in Accra; 0 otherwise
Town: I if household resides in Urban area outside Accra; 0 otherwise
Rcoastal: I if household resides in Rural Coastal area; 0 otherwise
Rforest: I if household resides in Rural Forest area; 0 otherwise
Rsavannah: I if household resides in Rural Savannah area; 0 otherwise (reference  group)
Tschexp: schooling expenditures (fees+books+clothes+other  expenditures) (cluster median)
Distance: distance to the local school in minutes (cluster median)
Smiss2: 1 if the school supply variables (Tschexp and Distance) are missing; 0 otherwise
33Annex 2: Descriptive statistics of variables used in Probit
Variables  Urban  Rural  Boys  Girls  Total
mean  st. dev.  mean  st. dev.  mean  st. dev.  mean  st. dev.  mean  st. dev.
Labour  0.08  0.27  0.38  0.48  0.29  0.46  0.27  0.44  0.28  0.45
School7  0.83  0.38  0.68  0.47  0.77  0.42  0.68  0.47  0.73  0.45
LabourHk  0.90  0.31  0.88  0.33  0.85  0.35  0.91  0.28  0.88  0.32
Agey  10.46  2.25  10.22  2.27  10.31  2.29  10.28  2.24  10.30  2.26
Male  0.50  0.50  0.53  0.50  1.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.52  0.50
Relson  0.78  0.41  0.79  0.41  0.80  0.40  0.77  0.42  0.78  0.41
Motherln  0.73  0.45  0.74  0.44  0.74  0.44  0.74  0.44  0.74  0.44
Fatherln  0.55  0.50  0.63  0.48  0.63  0.48  0.58  0.49  0.60  0.49
MedO  0.49  0.50  0.76  0.42  0.68  0.47  0.67  0.47  0.68  0.47
Medl  0.12  0.32  0.10  0.29  0.10  0.30  0.10  0.30  0.10  0.30
Med2  0.30  0.46  0.13  0.34  0.18  0.38  0.20  0.40  0.19  0.39
Med3  0.09  0.28  0.01  0.09  0.03  0.18  0.03  0.18  0.03  0.18
FedO  0.31  0.46  0.55  0.50  0.48  0.50  0.46  0.50  0.47  0.50
Fedi  0.07  0.25  0.08  0.27  0.07  0.25  0.09  0.28  0.08  0.26
Fed2  0.40  0.49  0.30  0.46  0.33  0.47  0.33  0.47  0.33  0.47
Fed3  0.22  0.41  0.07  0.26  0.12  0.32  0.12  0.32  0.12  0.32
Wpcec  196611  125866  180069  110111  183887  116396  187064  114931  185421  115687
Mheadeco  0.48  0.50  0.67  0.47  0.63  0.48  0.59  0.49  0.61  0.49
ChildO6  1.28  1.35  1.52  1.23  1.45  1.32  1.44  1.23  1.44  1.28
Bro714  0.45  0.91  0.42  0.71  0.47  0.81  0.39  0.74  0.43  0.78
Sis714  0.38  0.68  0.35  0.64  0.36  0.65  0.36  0.65  0.36  0.65
MaleI559  1.27  1.22  1.21  1.03  1.26  1.12  1.19  1.08  1.23  1.10
Feml559  1.61  1.01  1.53  1.01  1.55  1.03  1.56  0.99  1.56  1.01
Old60  0.22  0.45  0.35  0.59  0.32  0.56  0.30  0.54  0.31  0.55
Catho  0.15  0.35  0.14  0.35  0.13  0.34  0.15  0.35  0.14  0.35
Protes  0.18  0.39  0.18  0.38  0.17  0.37  0.19  0.39  0.18  0.38
Ochris  0.33  0.47  0.24  0.42  0.26  0.44  0.27  0.44  0.27  0.44
Muslim  0.25  0.43  0.15  0.36  0.19  0.39  0.17  0.38  0.18  0.39
Animist  0.08  0.27  0.29  0.45  0.23  0.42  0.22  0.41  0.22  0.42
Selfagro  0.16  0.36  0.69  0.46  0.53  0.50  0.50  0.50  0.52  0.50
Selfbus  0.48  0.50  0.18  0.38  0.27  0.44  0.29  0.45  0.28  0.45
Landsize  5.94  34.60  18.30  75.95  14.69  66.29  13.88  65.16  14.30  65.74
Animal  0.18  1.78  0.98  3.90  0.81  3.63  0.63  3.08  0.72  3.38
Accra  0.21  0.40  0.00  0.00  0.06  0.24  0.07  0.26  0.07  0.25
Town  0.79  0.40  0.00  0.00  0.25  0.43  0.27  0.44  0.26  0.44
Rcoastal  0.00  0.00  0.19  0.40  0.14  0.34  0.13  0.33  0.13  0.34
Rforest  0.00  0.00  0.43  0.49  0.30  0.46  0.28  0.45  0.29  0.45
Rsav  0.00  0.00  0.38  0.48  0.26  0.44  0.25  0.44  0.26  0.44
Tschexp  11971  8414  4827  3778  7027  6416  7257  6816  7138  6612
Distance  34.27  16.05  29.66  36.35  31.10  29.69  31.20  33.01  31.15  31.33
Smiss2  0.01  0.09  0.03  0.18  0.02  0.14  0.03  0.16  0.02  0.15
Sample Size  1233  2578  1971  1840  3811
34Table A3: Determinants of Labour Force Participation and School Participation,
Children Aged 7-10
Model I (Urban + Rural)  Model 2 (Rural only)
Labour  Force  School Participation  Labour Force  School Participation
Participation  Participation
Independent  Marginal  t-ratio  Marginal  t-ratio  Marginal  t-ratio  Marginal  t-ratio
Variable  Effect  Effect  Effect  Effect
Constant  -4.1894  -1.391  -2.1153  -6.557  -7.8369  -1.835  -2.6232  -6.071
Agey  0.0586  7.432  0.0489  5.082  0.0756  6.717  0.0572  4.285
Male  0.0068  0.397  0.0939  4.283  0.0206  0.844  0.0983  3.377
Relson  -0.0224  -0.558  0.0836  1.722  -0.0351  -0.625  0.1060  1.596
Motherln  0.0175  0.574  -0.0533  -1.375  0.0263  0.622  -0.1014  -2.009
Fatherln  -0.0484  -1.424  0.0765  1.908  -0.0524  -1.078  0.1173  1.971
Medl  -0.0251  -0.885  0.1296  2.976  -0.0431  -1.029  0.0937  1.628
Med2  -0.0090  -0.339  0.1808  4.473  -0.0047  -0.116  0.2848  4.605
Med3  -0.0487  -0.661  0.0295  0.345  -0.1173  -0.689  0.1092  0.482
Fedl  -0.0237  -0.729  0.0825  1.855  -0.0495  -1.042  0.0950  1.631
Fed2  -0.0329  -1.435  0.0855  2.827  -0.0405  -1.224  0.0955  2.399
Fed3  -0.1155  -2.765  0.1729  3.165  -0.1565  -2.468  0.2091  2.560
Lnpcwell  0.5010  0.999  0.1080  4.459  1.0070  1.415  0.1338  4.156
Lnpcwell2  -0.0209  -1.003  - - -0.0417  -1.410  - -
ChildO6  0.0071  0.942  -0.0100  -0.978  0.0075  0.688  -0.0183  -1.292
Bro714  0.0093  0.620  0.0066  0.367  0.0184  0.765  0.0001  0.004
Sis714  -0.0088  -0.544  0.0361  1.700  -0.0160  -0.663  0.0716  2.250
MalelS59  0.0091  0.965  -0.0178  -1.590  0.0148  1.053  -0.0018  -0.107
FemlSS9  -0.0099  -0.908  0.0044  0.331  -0.0158  -1.006  0.0134  0.726
Old60  0.0010  0.059  -0.0183  -0.933  0.0057  0.242  0.0028  0.108
Selfagro  0.0900  3.362  -0.0495  -1.396  0.0879  2.225  -0.0358  -0.674
Selfbus  -0.0719  -2.197  0.0694  1.791  -0.1232  -2.491  0.0949  1.431
Mheadeco  -0.0063  -0.207  -0.0210  -0.608  -0.0268  -0.633  -0.0823  -1.599
Muslim  -0.0280  -0.980  0.0937  2.847  0.0057  0.139  . 0.0784  1.748
Catho  0.0061  0.220  0.1337  3.543  -0.0132  -0.326  0.1497  2.962
Protes  0.0148  0.528  0.2488  6.407  0.0169  0.415  0.2862  5.694
Ochris  -0.0176  -0.672  0.1536  4.567  -0.0253  -0.659  0.1567  3.479
Landsize  0.00004  0.276  -0.0001  -0.438  0.0001  0.441  -0.0001  -0.480
Animal  0.0022  0.752  -0.0157  -3.342  0.0033  0.863  -0.0209  -3.665
Accra  -0.1259  -1.976  0.0428  0.595  - - - -
Town  -0.1389  -4.123  0.0747  1.815  - - -
Rcoastal  0.0789  2.483  0.0054  0.141  0.0804  1.842  -0.0107  -0.233
Rforest  0.1558  6350  0.1622  4.753  0.1905  5.778  0.1829  4.454
Tschexp  0.0560  3.591  0.0403  2.014  0.1033  4.827  0.0562  2.051
Distance  -0.0002  -0.762  -0.0014  -4.792  -0.0002  -0.335  -0.0017  -4.851
Smiss2  0.4115  3.030  -0.3894  -2.032  0.6454  3.445  -0.3387  -1.357
p  -0.1291  -2.362  -0.0852  -1.445
lnL  -1763.6  -1409.0
lnL(=0)  -2356.7  -1825.0
Sample Size  2116  1480Table A4:  Determinants of Labour Force Participation and School Participation,
Children Aged 11-14
Model I (Urban + Rural)  Model 2 (Rural only)
Labour Force  School Participation  Labour Force  School Participation
Participation  Participation
Independent  Marginal  t-ratio  Marginal  t-ratio  Marginal  t-ratio  Marginal  t-ratio
Variable  Effect  Effect  Effect  Effect
Constant  -11.8590  -2.290  -0.9257  -2.890  -17.0300  -2.646  -1.1004  -2.494
Agey  0.0379  2.997  -0.0233  -2.196  0.0448  2.831  -0.0296  -1.970
Male  0.0122  0.478  0.1318  5.793  0.0345  1.066  0.1380  4.409
Relson  -0.0840  -1.517  -0.0628  -1.307  -0.0587  -0.805  -0.2222  -3.295
Motherln  0.0735  1.716  0.0102  0.279  0.0671  1.210  0.0156  0.316
Fatherln  -0.1467  -2.997  0.1071  2.650  -0.1998  -3.178  0.2103  3.535
Medl  0.0065  0.141  0.0399  0.931  0.0148  0.252  0.0479  0.757
Med2  -0.0284  -0.708  0.1106  2.836  -0.0748  -1.365  0.0928  1.586
Med3  0.0822  0.737  0.0677  0.775  - - -
Fedi  -0.0386  -0.771  0.1373  2.808  -0.0505  -0.804  0.1463  2.192
Fed2  -0.0345  -1.032  0.1296  4.180  -0.0234  -0.553  0.1228  2.994
Fed3  -0.1318  -2.259  0.1448  3.034  -0.1223  -1.613  0.1840  2.490
Lnpcwell  1.8960  2.198  0.0499  2.145  2.7319  2.550  0.0750  2.385
Lnpcwell2  -0.0797  -2.218  - - -0.1147  -2.570  -
ChildO6  -0.0138  -1.136  -0.0051  -0.506  -0.0031  -0.198  0.0035  0.249
Bro714  0.0084  0.501  0.0164  1.242  0.0140  0.642  - 0.0135  0.717
Sis714  -0.0211  -1.130  0.0379  2.287  -0.0278  -1.191  0.0649  2.701
MalelS59  0.0351  2.640  -0.0130  -1.136  0.0505  2.812  -0.0144  -0.849
Feml559  0.0140  1.117  0.0016  0.138  -0.0005  -0.029  -0.0085  -0.528
Old60  0.0294  1.260  -0.0525  -2.592  0.0191  0.643  -0.0798  -3.009
Selfagro-  0.1546  4.004  0.0025  0.072  0.1154  2.187  -0.0079  -0.157
Selfbus  -0.1040  -2.260  - 0.0228  0.629  -0.1899  -2.794  0.0092  0.140
Mheadeco  0.0877  2.053  -0.0548  -1.628  0.0795  1.441  -0.1410  -2.907
Muslim  0.0363  0.910  0.0021  0.063  0.0708  1.381  -0.0068  -0.153
Catho  -0.0348  -0.793  0.1252  3.021  -0.0125  -0.226  0.1463  2.610
Protes  0.0562  1.289  0.1010  2.666  0.1122  2.080  0.1412  2.757
Ochris  -0.0539  -1.397  0.0658  1.844  -0.0459  -0.913  0.0658  1.382
Landsize  -0.0001  -0.648  0.0007  1.569  -0.0001  -0.437  0.0006  1.362
Animal  0.0027  0.548  -0.0074  -3.239  0.0038  0.685  -0.0069  -2.561
Accra  -0.5721  -5.968  0.0684  1.028  - -
Town  -0.2492  -5.894  0.0498  1.195  - -
Rcoastal  0.0821  1.736  0.0255  0.607  0.0547  0.984  0.0171  0.339
Rforest  0.0468  1.293  0.1910  5.272  0.0218  0.510  0.2191  5.203
Tschexp  0.0079  0.794  0.0689  3.972  0.0273  1.895  0.0788  3.402
Distance  -0.0016  -3.315  -0.0008  -2.412  -0.0017  -3.071  -0.0009  -2.092
p  -0.1778  -3.278  -0.1773  -2.732
InL  -1607.6  -1176.8
InL(=0)  -2079.9  -1426.9
Sample Size  1695  1098
36Table A5:  Determinants of Labour Force Participation (including
housekeeping activities) and School Participation, Children Aged 7-14
Model I (Urban + Rural)  Model 2 (Rural only)
Labour Force  School Participation  Labour Force  School Participation
Participation  Participation
Independent  1 - coefficient  t-ratio  J - coefficient  t-ratio  1 - coefficient  t-ratio  ,B  - coefficient  t-ratio
Variable
Constant  -4.9121  -4.491  -7.7317  -8.258  -5.7986  *-2.646  -8.3653  -7.337
Agey  0.8528  5.675  0.6473  5.490  0.8443  4.457  0.7037  4.810
Agey2  -0.0310  -4.165  -0.0307  -5.445  -0.0305  -3.249  -0.3301  -4.707
Male  -0.2304  -3.434  0.3742  7.178  -0.3049  -3.528  0.3378  5.431
Relson  -0.3006  -1.956  0.0366  0.331  -0.3739  -1.830  -0.2016  -1.493
Motherln  0.1430  1.334  -0.0567  -0.649  0.0781  0.585  -0.0975  -0.965
Fatherln  -0.1624  -1.324  0.3226  3.472  -0.0959  -0.553  0.5137  4.215
Medl  0.0059  0.049  0.2800  2.840  0.0175  0.111  0.2296  1.882
Med2  0.0055  0.050  0.4792  5.188  0.0115  0.075  0.5644  4.600
Med3  -0.1148  -0.624  0.1862  0.932  0.1289  0.230  0.6333  0.770
Fedl  -0.0087  -0.062  0.3840  3.499  0.0261  0.156  0.3682  2.815
Fed2  0.0435  -0.442  0.3572  5.038  0.0134  0.107  0.3025  3.641
Fed3  -0.2900  -2.244  0.5207  4.410  -0.4681  -2.587  0.5347  3.269
Lnpcwell  0.0090  0.138  0.2797  5.136  0.0401  0.458  0.3225  4.916
ChildO6  0.0115  0.417  -0.0263  -1.130  0.0777  2.139  -0.0261  -0.892
Bro714  0.0083  0.181  0.0440  1.273  0.0324  0.433  0.0329  0.693
Sis714  0.0439  0.716  0.1169  2.792  0.0127  0.160  0.1958  3.520
Malel559  0.0181  0.499  -0.0454  -1. 704  0.0228  0.480  -0.0271  -0. 776
Fem1559  -0.2123  -5.970  0.0165  0.574  -0.2202  -4.688  0.0134  0.377
Od60  -0.0702  -1.048  -0.1099  -2.360  0.0668  -0.809  -0.1123  -2.075
Selfagro  0.1598  1.562  -0.0914  -1.119  0.3008  2.210  -0.0754  -0.697
Selfbus  -0.2233  -2.133  0.1578  1.802  -0.2618  -1.546  0.1906  1.400
Mheadeco  0.0371  0.353  -0.1498  -1.910  -0.0862  -0.572  -0.3545  -3.448
Muslim  0.0003  0.003  0.1713  2.184  0.1589  1.309  0.1087  1.160
Catho  0.0474  0.394  0.4592  4.989  -0.0093  -0.065  0.4808  4.324
Protes  0.2595  2.197  0.6057  6.816  0.2854  2.013  0.6797  6.559
Ochris  0.1967  1.746  0.4002  4.992  0.2301  1.600  0.3801  3.998
Landsize  -0.0004  -0.989  0.0002  0.599  -0.0006  -1.185  0.0001  0.334
Animal  -0.0006  -0.071  -0.0373  -6.690  0.0088  0.669  -0.0377  -6.555
Accra  0.0964  0.548  0.2633  1.697  - - - -
Town  0.1101  0.957  0.2564  2.623  - -
Rcoastal  -0.0575  -0.487  0.0748  0.803  0.0206  0.158  0.0271  0.274
Rforest  0.4461  4.079  0.6155  7.639  0.5272  4.301  0.6168  7.206
Tschexp  0.1596  2.874  0.1082  2.358  0.2203  3.166  0.1124  3.032
Distance  -0.0005  -0.389  -0.0041  -5.371  0.0000  0.022  -0.0042  -5.234
Smiss  11.2714  2.568  -1.7504  -3.507  1.6947  2.799  -1.6265  -2.932
p  -0.0721  -1.452  -0.0035  -0.061
InL  -2663.7  -1832.1
InL(=0)  -3507.9  -2486.7
Sample Size  3811  2578
37Policy Research Working Paper Series
Contact
Title  Author  Date  for paper
WPS1828  The Determinants of Banking Crises:  Asli  Demirg0Q-Kunt  September 1997  P. Sintim-Aboagye
Evidence from Developed and  Enrica Detragiache  38526
Developing Countries
WPS1829  Economic Reform and progress in  Norman Loayza  September 1997  E. Khine
Latin America and the Caribbean  Luisa Palacios  37471
WPS1830  Private Ownership and Corporate  Roman Frydman  September 1997  B. Moore
Performance: Some Lessons from  Cheryl W. Gray  38526
Transition  Economies  Marek Hessel
Andrzej Rapaczynski
WPS1831  How Trade Patterns and Technology  Wolfgang Keller  September 1997  J. Ngaine
Flows Affect Productivity Growth  37947
WPS1832  Pension Reform in Bolivia: Innovative  Hermann von Gersdorff  September 1997  C. Pavlak
Solutions to Common Problems  82099
WPS1833  Cost Recovery and Pricing of  David B. Humphrey  October 1997  T. Ishibe
Payment Services  Robert H. Keppler  38968
Feemando  Montes-Negret
WPS1 834 The Comparative Advantage of  Pedro Belli  October 1997  L. Schunk
Government: A Review  31779
WPS1 835 Cost-Benefit Analysis of the Global  Aehyung Kim  October 1997  A. Kim
Dracunculiasis Eradication Campaign Ajay Tandon  35029
Ernesto Ruiz-Tiben
WPS1836  Health and Labor Productivity: The  Aehyung Kim  October 1997  A. Kim
Economic Impact of Onchocercal  Ajay Tandon  35029
Skin Disease  Asrat Hairu and Others
WPS1 837 How Estonia's Economic Transition  Rivo Noorkoiv  October 1997  S. Fallon
Affected Employment and Wages  Peter F. Orazem  38009
(1989-95)  Allan Puur
Milan Vodopivec
WPS1838  The Limits and Merits of Participation  Paulo Vieira da Cunha  October 1997  E. Thomas
Maria Valeria Junho Pena  31019
WPS1839  The Effects of Financial Liberalization  Cevdet Denizer  November 1997  E. Khine
and New Bank Entry on Market  37471
Structure and Competition in Turkey
WPS1840  Efficient Public Sector Downsizing  Martin Rama  November 1997  S. Fallon
38009
WPS1841  Patterns of Metropolitan  Gregory K. Ingram  November 1997  J. Ponchamni
Development: What Have We Learned?  31052Policy  Research  Working  Paper  Series
Contact
Title  Author  Date  for paper
WPS1842 Motorization  and the Provision  of  Gregory  K. Ingram  November  1997  J. Ponchamni
Roads  in Countries  and Cities  Zhi Liu  31052
WPS1843 Extemalities  and Bailouts:  Hard  and  David  E. Wildasin  November  1997  C. Bernardo
Soft Budget  Constraints  in  37699
Intergovernmental  Fiscal Relations